NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System - “Callback”

The August 2010 issue of “Callback” is posted at the following:

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/cb/cb_368.pdf

Topic is the “PAVE” Checklist.

FAA Safety Briefing - July/August 2010

The July/August 2010 FAA Safety Briefing document can be found at the following link:

http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/2010/media/JulAug2010.pdf

Previous issue can be retrieved by going to the following link.

http://www.faa.gov/news/safety%5Fbriefing/

“Position and Hold” Soon to be History!!

“Line Up and Wait” in Preparation for Takeoff

You do it at the movie theater, the supermarket, as well as your favorite coffee shop on the way to work: You line up and wait. And, after September 30, 2010, you may also be asked to do it at your local towered airport.

Designed to help simplify and standardize air traffic control (ATC) phraseology, as well as to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, U.S. controllers will use the term “line up and wait” in place of “position and hold” when instructing a pilot to taxi onto a departure runway and wait for takeoff clearance. Both current and future versions of the phrase are used when takeoff clearance cannot immediately be issued, either because of traffic or other reasons.

Why “line up and wait?” The phrase has actually been in use by a majority of ICAO contracting states for many years. It has proven useful with many non-native English speakers who can sometimes confuse “position and hold” with similar-sounding phrases like “position and roll,” “position at hold,” or “hold position.” Misinterpretation of this instruction can have serious consequences. Using “line up and wait” helps avoid ambiguity and keeps the global aviation community accountable to the same standard.

Here’s an example of the phrase in use: Tower: “Cessna 1234, Runway Three Four Left, line up and wait.”
Pilot: “XYZ Tower, Cessna 1234, Runway Three Four Left, line up and wait.”

This change was expected to take effect September 30, 2010. The specific date and additional details will be communicated via updates to the Aeronautical Informational Manual (AIM) and Pilot/Controller Glossary, both located under the Air Traffic section of www.faa.gov.

FAA Safety Briefing - May/June 2010

The May/June 2010 FAA Safety Briefing document can be found at the following link:

http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/2010/media/MayJun2010.pdf

Previous issue can be retrieved by going to the following link.

http://www.faa.gov/news/safety%5Fbriefing/

NTSB Issues Hudson River Crash Report

CNN reports the pilot of a small plane that collided with a sightseeing helicopter over New York’s

Hudson River last summer had scant seconds to see the helicopter as it rose to his altitude, but the plane pilot apparently attempted evasive action immediately before the collision, NTSB documents released Wednesday show. Computer-generated images show the helicopter appeared as a tiny spot, perhaps lost among the backdrop of

Manhattan
buildings, in the seconds before the crash, which killed nine people. It would have been difficult for the plane’s pilot to see the helicopter “until the last instant,” one National Transportation Safety Board document says. And since the Piper PA-32 was above and behind the slower moving helicopter, “it is not likely that the airplane would have been visible to the pilot of the helicopter,” the NTSB said. All three people on the private plane and all six aboard the sightseeing helicopter died in the August 8, 2009, crash. The two aircraft collided over the Hudson River, a heavily trafficked corridor separating Manhattan and

Hoboken, N.J. Pilots of both aircraft were operating under visual flight rules, which requires aircraft pilots to “see and be seen.” But the pilot of the plane also was receiving “flight following” radar service from air traffic control, intended to help keep aircraft separate. The NTSB is reviewing, among other things, the actions of two air traffic controllers, one of whom was involved in a personal phone call at the time of the mishap, and another who was running a personal errand. Both controllers were placed on administrative leave after the collision. Three months after the crash, the FAA also tightened control of the airspace, separating low-altitude local aircraft flights over the

Hudson River, such as a sightseeing helicopter, from flights transiting through the river airspace, such as the small aircraft.

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Free Newsletter

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS): An Integral Part of Your Personal Safety Management System, adapted from the NASA ASRS website. (Note: Callback is electronic now, please sign up today to continue to receive your free copy!) The ASRS is a small but important facet of the collaborative effort by the FAA, industry, and individuals to maintain and improve aviation safety. NASA collects voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation reports for the FAA from pilots, controllers, flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers and others. The ASRS acts on the information these reports contain. It identifies system deficiencies, and issues alerting messages to persons in a position to correct them, for example, regulatory agencies and manufacturers. It educates through its e-newsletter CALLBACK, its journal ASRS Directline and through its research studies. The ASRS database is a public repository which serves the FAA and NASA’s needs and those of other organizations world-wide which are engaged in research and the promotion of safe flight.

ASRS data is used to:

  • Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System (NAS) so that these can be remedied by appropriate authorities.
  • Support policy formulation and planning for, and improvements to, the NAS.
  • Strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research. This is particularly important since it is generally conceded that over two-thirds of all aviation accidents and incidents have their roots in human performance errors.

In order to receive e-Callback you must sign up at can sign up at:

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback.html

You can also visit the new ASRS website and check out their online database and Electronic Report submission portal, or read CALLBACK online. ASRS received over 48,000 reports from Pilots, Controllers, Mechanics and Flight Attendants last year. You can search the database, which is a great capability and helps us to learn from other people’s experiences. ASRS is the cornerstone of an effective safety management system. The more we add to the database the better a source of knowledge it becomes. Quality reporting enables valid safety risk assessments. From there, safety assurance and promotion activities follow. e-Callback is a feedback mechanism that forms the foundation of a vibrant personal aviation safety program. Consider it part of your monthly safety recurrent. So sign up today and become part of the system solution!

For more info: NASA ASRS: http:// asrs .arc.nasa.gov/

GA Accidents Fall Sharply in 2009

Preliminary 2009 aviation accident statistics released by the NTSB late last week show an overall decrease in aviation accidents for general aviation and on-demand Part 135 operations. According to the Safety Board, on-demand Part 135 operations had the lowest number of accidents and fatal accidents last year compared with any other time in the past two decades. General aviation accidents decreased from 1,566 in 2008 to 1,474 last year, though the accident rate increased to 7.20 per 100,000 flight hours last year from 6.86 in 2008 due to the decrease in the total number of flight hours. Fatal GA accidents edged down to 272 last year from 275 in 2008. Although fatalities decreased to 474 from 494, the fatal accident rate increased to 1.33 from 1.21, also because of fewer flight hours last year. On-demand Part 135 operations reported 47 accidents, down from 58 in 2008, while fatalities also decreased to 17 in 2009 from 69 in 2008. Despite the lower flight activity last year, the on-demand accident rate decreased to 1.63 per 100,000 flight hours from 1.81 in 2008.

Hudson River SFRA

Several changes have been made to the Hudson River airspace.  For the latest details on the Special Flight Rules Area over the Hudson River, goto the following FAA website.

http://faasafety.gov/files/helpcontent/Courses/NY%20Course/index.html

Great Safety Resources

Two great resources for safety information are the following:

 http://www.faasafety.gov/

and

http://www.aopa.org/asf/

 Both websites provide several programs to educate pilots on varying topic areas.  If you register on the FAA site you can establish personnel preferences for email notification that can include future safety seminars to airspace alerts.  The educational information on the AOPA Air Safety Foundation website is very valuable as well.  Participation in any of the programs is free and can also be used as credit in the FAA Wings Program.  Additionally, pilots can receive credit applied to a BFR.

178 seconds to live

178 Seconds To Live
Words to Live By
Author Unknown
How long can a pilot who has little or no instrument training expect to live after he flies into bad weather and loses visual contact? Researchers at the University of Illinois did some tests and came up with some very interesting data. Twenty student “guinea pigs” flew into simulated instrument weather, and all went into graveyard spirals or rollercoasters [a tribute to the U of I flight training program??]. The outcome differed in only one respect - the time required till control was lost. The interval ranged from 480 seconds to 20 seconds. The average time was 178 seconds* — two seconds short of three minutes.

Here’s the fatal scenario. . . . . . .

The sky is overcast and the visibility is poor. That reported five mile visibility looks more like two, and you can’t judge the height of the overcast. Your altimeter tells you that you are at 1500 feet but your map tells you that there’s local terrain as high as 1200 feet. There might be a tower nearby because you’re not sure how far off course you are. But you’ve flown into worse weather than this, so press on.

You find yourself unconsciously easing back just a bit on the controls to clear those towers. With no warning, you’re in the soup. You peer so hard into the milky white mist that your eyes hurt. You fight the feeling in your stomach. You try to swallow, only to find your mouth dry. Now you realize you should have waited for better weather. The appointment was important, but not all that important. Somewhere a voice is saying, “You’ve had it — it’s all over!”

You now have 178 seconds to live.

Your aircraft feels on even keel but your compass turns slowly. You push a little rudder and add a little pressure on the controls to stop the turn but this feels unnatural and you return the controls to their original position. This feels better but now your compass is turning a little faster and your airspeed is increasing slightly. You scan your instruments for help but what you see looks somewhat unfamiliar. You’re sure that this is just a bad spot. You’ll break out in a few minutes. (But you don’t have a few minutes left.)

You now have 100 seconds to live.

You glance at your altimeter and you are shocked to see it unwinding. You’re already down to 1200 feet. Instinctively, you pull back on the controls but the altimeter still unwinds. The engine is into the red and the airspeed, nearly so.

You have 45 seconds to live.

Now you’re sweating and shaking. There must be something wrong with the controls; pulling back only moves the airspeed indicator further into the red. You can hear the wind tearing at the aircraft.

You are about to meet your Maker; you have 10 seconds to live. Suddenly you see the ground. The trees rush up at you. You can see the horizon if you turn your head far enough but it’s at a weird angle — you’re almost inverted. You open your mouth to scream but. . . . . .

. . . .you just ran our of seconds.

Think about it before you press on into marginal weather.

* “An AOPA-funded study conducted in 1954 by Jesse W. Stonecipher, then chief flight instructor at the University of Illinois, Urbana, indicated that the average life expectancy of a non-instrument rated pilot in IMC was 178 seconds from the onset to loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Of the 20 subjects tested, 19 entered graveyard spirals and the 20th stalled his aircraft. None of them lasted over eight minutes and all had the same skills training. There’s no reason to believe those figures have changed in the past half century.”

— Illusions: Spatial Disorientation and Loss of Control by Dick McKinney. Business & Commercial Aviation magazine, March 2008 pg. 63.